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Abstract
With advances in Generative Adversarial Networks
(GANs) leading to dramatically-improved synthetic images
and video, there is an increased need for algorithms which
extend traditional forensics to this new category of imagery.
While GANs have been shown to be helpful in a number
of computer vision applications, there are other problem-
atic uses such as ‘deep fakes’ which necessitate such foren-
sics. Source camera attribution algorithms using various
cues have addressed this need for imagery captured by a
camera, but there are fewer options for synthetic imagery.
We address the problem of attributing a synthetic image to
a specific generator in a white box setting, by inverting the
process of generation. This enables us to simultaneously
determine whether the generator produced the image and
recover an input which produces a close match to the syn-
thetic image.
1. Introduction
Because of its use in ‘fake news’ and ‘revenge porn’,
the implications of fully- or partially-synthetic imagery has
recently become a matter of broad social concern. Under-
lying both of these is the technology of deep networks used
to generate imagery, often of faces, that are increasingly re-
alistic. Whereas traditional image forensics already include
powerful techniques applicable to images captured with a
wide range of cameras [16, 12, 3, 4, 9], there are relatively
fewer options available to forensic analysts operating on
synthetic imagery.
We aim to close the capability gap between source
camera attribution and source generator attribution, and
to provide additional functionality for generator attribu-
tion. Source camera attribution methods vary consider-
ably, but typically use low-level cues (such sensor non-
uniformity) and statistical indicators; they are unable to re-
create the image capture process, because the physical cam-
era may be unattainable and the scene being photographed
may be ephemeral. Neither of these restrictions apply to
Figure 1. Image attribution by generator inversion: Given a syn-
thetic probe image I and pre-trained generators Gi, the generators
are inverted to find latent vectors z˜i such that generated outputs
Gi(z˜) approximate the probe. Attribution is assigned to the gen-
erator with the best reconstruction (red dashed line).
synthetically-generated imagery, so we expand the attri-
bution problem to encompass both the determination of
whether the generator produced the image and the inputs
necessary to re-create the generation process. Mathemati-
cally, we describe the generator as a functionGwhich trans-
forms a vector z into an image Ig as
Ig = G(z). (1)
When there are multiple (known) generators G1, G2, etc.
the limited attribution problem is to determine for a
‘probe’ image I the value of i that - for some value z - satis-
fies Gi(z) = I˜ ≈ I . The related inversion problem, given
a specific generator G and probe image I , is to estimate a
latent vector z˜ such that G(z˜) = I˜ ≈ I. In both, we use ap-
proximation to acknowledge that small differences should
be expected due to quantization, dynamic range clipping,
and perhaps compression applied to I .
In our extended attribution problem (Fig. 1), we con-
sider the case where there are multiple (known) generators
and, given a probe image, we determine both i and z˜ such
thatGi(z˜) = I˜ ≈ I . The utility of attribution, in the context
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of synthetically generated imagery, is that training GAN-
based generators for high-resolution outputs is compute-
intensive, data-intensive, and error-prone. As such, the ma-
jority of users are more likely to download and use publicly-
available generators than they are to train their own from the
ground up. We also believe that, beyond limited attribution,
the ability to re-create the generation process (enabled by
our estimation of z) is critical to improving the explainabil-
ity of the attribution decision.
In our experiments, we demonstrate extended attribution
on generators from two different domains, trained via two
different methods. We first show that the generative layers
of an auto-encoder, trained on MNIST [13] characters, can
successfully be attributed in increasingly difficult scenar-
ios, up to and including discrimination between generators
trained on the same data, in the same order, but with differ-
ent random seeds. We then show that generators trained to
produce realistic facial images in a GAN can be attributed,
and discuss some of the interesting similarities and differ-
ences between the probe and reconstructed image.
2. Related Work
Both the limited attribution and inversion problems de-
scribed in the introduction have attracted attention in recent
years. For attribution, Yu et al. [24] and Marra et al. [19]
have recently presented methods which use noise-type sig-
natures to attribute a given image to a specific generator,
which is conceptually similar to how Photo Response Non-
Uniformity (PRNU) [16] provides source camera identifi-
cation. These methods are very successful, providing nearly
perfect attribution performance, even being able to discrim-
inate between two generators with the same architecture,
having been trained on the same data. A related prob-
lem is the detection of whether a given image was gener-
ated by any GAN-type generator, which has successfully
been demonstrated by several groups using various meth-
ods [18, 22, 7, 6, 14, 20].
The generator inversion problem has likewise attracted
attention. Creswell and Bharath [5] develop a generator in-
version method as a means to explore GAN performance
as a function of attributes in the image space. Luo et al.
[17] solve inversion by training an encoder coupled to a
pre-trained generator in an auto-encoder framework. Lip-
ton and Tripathi [15] introduce a method called stochastic
clipping to recover arbitrarily precise approximations of z,
even in the presence of simple types of noise. None of the
prior inversion work has addressed attribution.
Another related work, by Kilcheret al. [10], demon-
strates that generators instantiated with random weights can
produce blurry versions of real images from various bench-
mark datasets. This demonstrates that the convergence of
inversion, by itself, does not signal that the image can be
attributed to a generator.
3. Method
Our method for attributing a probe image I to a genera-
tor Gi is predicated on the assumption that other generators
Gj (j 6= i) cannot generate I as well as the true generator
Gi, so the minimum reconstruction error will correspond
to the true generator i. We offer a brief discussion on why
one may reasonably expect that situation to often (though
not always) hold: First, we note that generators map a low
dimensional latent vector z into very high dimensional out-
put space Gj(z). For instance, in the case of ProGAN
[8], dim(z) = 512 and dim(I) = 3,145,728 (3x1024x1024).
Hence, the mapping from z to Gj(z) parameterizes a union
of low dimensional manifolds (of dimension ≤ dim(z)) in
the high dimensional space [1]. Furthermore, there are
a number of sources of inherent randomness in generator
training, such as random initialization of network weights,
ordering of training images, and absence or inclusion of par-
ticular images in training batches. Arjovksy and Bottou [1]
have shown that it is highly improbable for low-dimensional
manifolds in high-dimensional spaces to perfectly overlap
everywhere if subjected to random perturbations; this is in
fact part of the motivation for using a Wasserstein metric
in Wasserstein GANs [1, 2]. Furthermore, in the case of
GANs, training failures such as mode dropping may make
the generator incapable of generating some regions of the
manifold of natural images.
In the extended attribution problem, illustrated in Figure
1, we start from a probe image I which was generated by
one of several generators G1, G2, . . . , Gn , where we as-
sume we know both the architecture and weights of all gen-
erators. We do not know a-priori which generator Gi made
the probe image, nor do we know the latent vector z, but
we seek to determine them. Note that if we could perfectly
identify z and i, we could (in the ideal case) perfectly recre-
ate the probe image I = Gi(z). In practice, there may be
some residual discrepancies due to post-processing of the
generated image, e.g. quantization, clipping, image com-
pression, etc., so we allow for for some small differences
between the probe image and the generator output. Hence,
we seek to estimate a latent vector z˜ such that Gi(z˜) = I˜
is as close as possible to the true probe I . For our experi-
ments, we formalize generator inversion as an optimization
problem, where we minimize the loss function
Lj(z) =
1
MN
||I −Gj(z)||2, (2)
with N and M being the number of pixels and color chan-
nels in the image, respectively.
We separately minimize Eq. 2 for each generator j, using
an optimization algorithm to find the best latent vector z
which minimizes the loss function. Attribution is assigned
to the generator i with the smallest residual error, and the
estimated latent vector z˜ is the point of minimum loss
z˜ = argmin
z
1
MN
||I −Gi(z)||2 . (3)
Because generators used in GANs and autoencoders are
neural networks, they are readily differentiable via back-
propagation, so the loss function in Eq. 2 may be optimized
efficiently using gradient-based methods; in this work, we
found the Adam [11] optimization algorithm to perform
well for all tested generators. Because Eq. 2 is not convex,
there is no guarantee that the optimization will converge to
a global minimum. Hence, to ensure low reconstruction er-
rors are obtained, we perform a multi-start optimization,
where we perform each optimization multiple times, each
starting from different random initial starting guesses for
the latent vector z, and we choose the result with the lowest
residual error.
We note that since the magnitude of the minimum resid-
ual error Lmini = Li(z˜) quantifies how well the generated
output Gi(z˜) = I˜ matches the probe image I , one may use
the residual errors to assess confidence in the attribution as-
signment: for a correct assignment, one would expect the
minimum loss Lmini to be very small, and for high confi-
dence it should be significantly smaller than reconstruction
errors Lminj from other generators j 6= i.
In the special case where there are only two generators i
and j, we can summarize our attribution decision and con-
fidence by a single numerical score:
S =
Lminj − Lmini
Lminj + L
min
i
. (4)
Note that S → 1 when the ith generator perfectly recon-
structs the probe (Lmini → 0), S → −1 when the jth
generator perfectly reconstructs the probe (Lminj → 0), and
S → 0 when both generators reconstruct the probe equally
well (Lmini = L
min
j ; no attribution possible). Hence, the
score S provides a natural way to evaluate attribution per-
formance using Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC)
curves, effectively treating binary attribution as binary clas-
sification; we do so in Section 4.1.
In the next section, we show that differences in gener-
ator training indeed contribute to detectable differences in
generated images, even in the case of identical generator
architectures.
4. Experiments
In this section, we describe experiments by which we
demonstrate the utility of our generator attribution and in-
version. They present a series of increasingly difficult attri-
bution problems, distinguishing between pairs of generators
with increasing similarity in how they are trained.
4.1. MNIST Experiments
The first set of experiments were carried out with the
MNIST dataset, selected because the smaller image size al-
lows for faster training and testing. In each MNIST exper-
iment, we trained a pair of fully-connected auto-encoders
with sigmoid activations and an L2 loss. The encoder and
decoder parts are symmetric, each having 784 nodes at the
input/output layers and hidden layers with 64 and 32 nodes
each. Each auto-encoder was trained on approximately
30,000 MNIST digits for 20,000 steps in batches of 256 im-
ages using the Adam optimization algorithm with a learning
rate of 0.01.
Once the training was completed, the decoders were sep-
arated from their encoders and the weights were frozen, ren-
dering them pre-trained generators which map 32 dimen-
sional latent vectors into 784 dimensional outputs. We then
performed optimization-based generator inversion for im-
age attribution on a test set consisting of 500 digits gener-
ated from each generator and saved as a PNG. We again
used the Adam optimization algorithm with a learning rate
of 0.01, and ran it for 1000 steps per inversion. Inversion
of the MNIST generators proved straightforward, but to re-
duce the chance of optimizers getting trapped in local min-
ima and biasing the results, we implemented a multi-start
optimization strategy, where optimization was repeated 10
times per image with 10 different random initial starting
guesses for the latent vector z. We assess performance by
treating attribution as a binary classification problem and
plotting the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve;
we use the Area Under the Curve (AUC) as a performance
summary statistic. We arbitrarily designated one of the gen-
erators as the target generator and measure the True Positive
Rate (TPR) at which outputs from the target generator are
classified as such. The False Positive Rate (FPR) measures
the frequency with which non-target generator outputs are
classified as target outputs. These values are computed over
a range of thresholds on S (as defined in Eq. 4).
Finally, we recall that each trained generator is influ-
enced by a number of sources of randomness in the training
process, such as the initial values of network weights, the
order of images in training, etc., so attribution performance
may vary if the experiment is repeated with different ran-
dom number generator seeds. To assess the uncertainty in
attribution performance, we repeat each MNIST experiment
five times and plot five ROC curves per figure.
4.1.1 Non-overlapping Training Data
In this experiment, we trained the auto-encoders on two
non-overlapping subsets of the MNIST digits. For simplic-
ity, we train one using odd digits and the other with even
digits, though we note that our attribution does not recog-
nize the digit or its parity. Having thus trained even and
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Figure 2. (Top) ROC curve on attribution between two generators
with non-overlapping training data. One generator is trained on
only even MNIST digits, and the other on odd digits. For refer-
ence, the diagonal line shows the performance of random attribu-
tion. The experiment is repeated 5 times. (Bottom rows) Exam-
ples of two successful attributions. The probe image (left) was
approximated with the even (middle) and odd (right) generators
via inversion.
odd digit generators, we attribute each of the test images by
the method descried above. Figure 2 shows that the perfor-
mance of our attribution on this experiment is nearly per-
fect, despite the fact that the generators do a surprisingly
good job synthesizing digits that they’ve never seen before.
The bottom row of Figure 2, for example, shows a ‘9’ syn-
thesized by an odd generator (left column) and reconstruc-
tions from inverting both even and odd generators (center
and right columns, respectively). Despite never having been
trained on ‘9’s, the even number generator can produce a
good approximation of this input, though less so for the odd
generator and the ‘2’ in the row above. We also observe
that variance in the area under the curve is quite low over
the five different repetitions of the experiment, indicating
the attribution performance is robust.
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Figure 3. (Top) ROC curve on attribution between two generators
with different permutations of the same training data. The experi-
ment is repeated 5 times. (Bottom rows) Examples of two unsuc-
cessful attributions.
4.1.2 Same Training Data, Different Order
In this experiment, we trained the auto-encoders on the
same set of MNIST digits (comprised of both even and odd
digits), but shuffled the order in which they’re used. Both
generators have the same architecture, but their weights re-
ceive different random initializations at the start of train-
ing. Figure 3 shows that the performance is reduced when
our algorithm is asked to differentiate between generators
trained with the same training data, and the variation in
performance between trials has also increased, but the per-
formance is still quite good in every trial. The figure also
shows two examples of mis-attribution, illustrating that the
outputs of the two generators are quite similar, visually, and
have reconstruction errors which are quite close to one an-
other. This portends difficulty in successfully attributing
images subject to the normal forensic challenges such as
compression and re-encoding.
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Figure 4. ROC curve on attribution between two generators with
the same training data, in the same order. Only the random initial-
ization of the network differs between the two generators, despite
which we can attribute their outputs well. The experiment is re-
peated 5 times.
4.1.3 Same Data, Same Ordering
In this experiment, the two auto-encoders are trained on the
same subset of MNIST digits, and those training digits are
presented in the same order. The only difference between
the two generators is the initial (random) weights. Despite
this high level of similarity, Fig. 4 shows that our approach
can unambiguously attribute > 70% of the inputs with ex-
tremely high confidence for all five trials.
4.1.4 Same Training Data, Different Order, with Com-
pression
In the last of our MNIST experiments, we quantify the im-
pact of JPEG compression on the performance of the attri-
bution algorithm. Compression is a well-known nuisance
factor for many forensic algorithms. In the case of our attri-
bution algorithm, compression introduces perturbations in
the probe image which move it off of the manifold repre-
senting the span of the generator’s output. Note that even
lossless compression does this, as the double precision out-
put of the generator is quantized to an integer. Given that
(a) compression is expected in most real-world uses of at-
tribution, (b) Kilcher et al. [10] showed that random GANs
can approximate a probe image, and (c) our empirical ob-
servation that outputs from the wrong generator can be quite
close to the probe image, it is important to understand how
likely compression is to lead to mis-attribution.
In order to study this impact, we re-visit the experiment
described in Sec. 4.1.2, where we discriminate between two
generators trained on the same MNIST data, but with dif-
ferent orderings of the training data. After training a pair
of networks, the two generators are used to create digits
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Figure 5. ROCs demonstrating performance of our attribution as
a function of JPEG compression quality factor. The blue curve
represents performance on probe images saved as PNGs, and the
other curves represent performance on JPEGs with a range of qual-
ity factors q. While increasing compression reduces performance,
the reduction is graceful and performance is still significantly bet-
ter than chance at a quality factor of 50.
which we compress using OpenCV’s imwrite function, us-
ing different values for the quality factor q (which ranges
from 0 to 100). Fig. 5 shows ROC curves from this ex-
periment, along with a reference ROC for images saved as
PNGs without compression. We see that while increasing
levels of JPEG compression do reduce performance, the
degradation is graceful and attribution performance is still
decidedly better than chance.
We emphasize that the different ROC curves shown in
Fig. 5 all originate from a single pair of generators, and the
differences between the curves originate in different com-
pression levels applied when saving a common set of test
images. This is very different from Fig. 3, which tested
attribution performance variation across different pairs of
generators trained with different random initializations and
different orderings of training data (but without lossy com-
pression).
In Fig. 6, we plot histograms of reconstruction errors
(Eq. 2) at different compression levels. In each histogram,
we show the errors obtained when inverting each of the gen-
erators on the test images produced by that generator. We
see reconstruction errors increase as the quality factor q de-
creases. However, the errors are still low enough to permit
attribution, as evidenced by the large AUCs in Fig. 5.
4.2. CelebA Experiments
In the second set of experiments, we performed attribu-
tion on generators that were trained as Generative Adver-
sarial Networks (GANs). The three GANs tested were Pro-
GAN [8], SAGAN [25], and SNGAN [21], all of which
Figure 6. Histograms of reconstruction errors (Eq. 2) at different
compression levels. The plots show reconstruction errors obtained
when inverting each of the generators from Sec. 4.1.4 on the test
images created by that generator.
were modified from their original description to output
128x128 resolution images and were trained on face im-
ages from the CelebA dataset. We re-used pre-trained gen-
erator weights shared by Ning Yu [24]. The SAGAN and
SNGAN generators proved easy to invert via optimization
algorithms, so multi-start was not strictly necessary, but for
good measure we employed 10 random initial optimization
starts per image. For each random start, we used the Adam
optimization algorithm with a learning rate of 0.1 and 1000
optimization steps per image, and chose the best recon-
struction with the lowest loss encountered. When inverting
SAGAN, we found it helpful to employ an explicit learning
rate reduction on plateau, to reduce oscillation in the loss as
the optimizer approached the minimum; we used a learning
rate shrink factor of 0.5 and a patience of 30. The ProGAN
generator proved slightly more challenging to invert reli-
ably, so we employed 20 random initial optimization starts
per image. We also used the Adam optimizer, but with a
learning rate of 0.9, 300 optimization steps per image, and
no explicit learning rate reduction (besides those built into
Adam).
We tested inversion-based attribution on a dataset of
1500 synthetic images (500 of which were generated by
ProGAN, 500 by SAGAN, and 500 by SNGAN) which
were saved as PNGs. As summarized in Table 1, attribu-
tion accuracy was 100% for images generated by SAGAN
and SNGAN and 95% for images generated by ProGAN.
Examples of successful attributions of images generated by
ProGAN and SAGAN are shown in Figures 8 and 9. As can
be seen in Figures 8 and 9, successful reconstruction of the
probe image by a generator offers compelling, interpretable
evidence that a probe image was created by the indicated
generator. This ability to offer strong, interpretable evi-
Figure 7. Histograms of Si scores for each generator. The top fig-
ure evaluates inversion of the ProGAN generator (P ), the middle
figure evaluates SAGAN inversion (SA), and the bottom figure
evaluates SNGAN inversion (SN). Each inversion is evaluated
on 500 probes created by ProgGAN, SAGAN, and SNGAN. Note
that Si → 1 when the algorithm is confident that the ith generator
was the source of the probe, and Si → −1 when the algorithm is
confident generator i was not the source.
dence of a synthetic image’s source is unique to our method
of generator attribution, compared to other attribution meth-
ods which tend to operate as black boxes without strong
interpretability or confidence measures. In Figure 10, we
show three examples where attribution of images generated
by ProGAN failed. From the figure, it is clear that the cause
of the failure is that the optimization algorithm failed to
converge to the best reconstruction, causing mis-attribution.
In each of the three cases, it is obvious that the quality of
the best image reconstruction is poor, with relatively large
residual error.
We can analyze the invertibility of each generator by
generalizing Eq. 4 to the situation of more than two gen-
erators. We define multiple Si scores, where each score Si
characterizes the reconstruction error achieved by generator
i on a particular image relative to the errors of other gener-
Source ProGAN SAGAN SNGAN
Accuracy 95% 100% 100%
Table 1. Inversion-based attribution accuracy, by data source, mea-
sured on a dataset of 1500 synthetic images—500 generated by
ProGAN, 500 by SAGAN, and 500 by SNGAN.
ators:
Si =
minj 6=i(Lminj )− Lmini
minj 6=i(Lminj ) + L
min
i
. (5)
(Intuitively, this is describing one-vs-rest classification.)
Note that with this extended formula, Si → 1 when gen-
erator i perfectly reconstructs the probe, Si → −1 when
a different generator j 6= i perfectly reconstructs the probe,
and Si → 0when generator i’s reconstruction error matches
the next-best reconstruction error (i.e., uncertain attribu-
tion). The scores are visualized in Fig. 7. From the bottom
two histograms, we can see that inversion-based attribution
worked very well for SAGAN and SNGAN—attribution
was correct 100% of the time and with high confidence
(Si ≈ ±1) on targets from those generators. From the
top histogram, we can see ProGAN attribution was more
difficult—there were more errors (SP < 0 on ProGAN tar-
gets) and lower attribution confidence (|SP | < 1 on Pro-
GAN targets), indicating that optimization-based inversion
of the ProGAN generator on ProGAN targets sometimes
struggled to produce extremely low reconstruction errors.
In addition to the above work, we experimented with
minimizing L1 loss functions, on the hope that it would en-
courage a sparser residual error vector ri = I −Gi(z˜), but
we saw no significant attribution benefit. We also tested
the LBFGS optimization algorithm, which uses 2nd-order
derivatives to accelerate convergence; similar to [23], we
found that significantly fewer optimization steps were re-
quired to invert an image, but we saw no significant benefit
in the minimum loss obtained by the optimizer.
5. Discussion
We have shown that generator inversion is a useful means
by which to pursue synthetic image attribution, with the
added advantage of being able to re-create the generation
process by estimating the latent vector via inversion. De-
spite this increased functionality, we achieve similar results
to black box systems such as Yu et al. [24]. Both our method
and Yu’s are able to distinguish between generators that are
quite similar, up to and including generators trained from
the same data in the same order.
While our attribution results correspond to a completely
automated system, it is interesting to consider how our out-
put image would be used and interpreted by a forensic ana-
lyst. As illustrated by Fig. 10, inversion failures are visually
salient and so the assigned attributions could be rejected
Figure 8. Examples of correct attribution of probe images gener-
ated by ProGAN. The top row shows probe images while the 2nd
through 4th rows show the closest approximations found by in-
verting ProGAN, SAGAN, and SNGAN generators. Green boxes
indicate the decision of our attribution algorithm. Note the sub-
tle differences in the 2nd column between the probe and ProGAN
reconstruction, indicating an imperfect inversion.
by the analyst for failing to meet quality thresholds. We
note, however, that designing such a threshold is non-trivial
in light of semantically meaningful differences between the
probe and reconstruction in the case of successful inversion,
an example of which is illustrated in Fig. 11.
6. Future Work
Though our experiments have so far been limited to at-
tribution between two or three generators, it can easily be
extended to N -way attribution with the use of Eq. 5; note
that the dynamic range would need to be normalized for
networks having different outputs, i.e. different than the
[−1, 1] range used by ProGAN, SAGAN, and SNGAN.
However, the computational complexity of inversion over
N generators can be quite high. Given the computational
complexity of inverting the generator, a more efficient sys-
tem could use an attribution-only method, i.e. one of
[24, 19], to determine the source generator and then apply
inversion on only that generator. Another extension would
be to train neural network encoders to explicitly perform
the inverse mapping from an image to a latent vector, which
Figure 9. Examples of correct attribution of probe images gener-
ated by SAGAN. The top row shows probe images while the 2nd
through 4th rows show the closest approximations found by in-
verting ProGAN, SAGAN, and SNGAN generators. Green boxes
indicate the decision of our attribution algorithm.
could also be further fine-tuned by optimization, as in [26].
One area of future work would be to extend our attri-
bution capabilities into the black box domain, in order to
handle generators which may be offered online as a service,
but without published network weights. It has been shown
that, for deep networks performing classification tasks, rep-
resentative proxy networks can be trained based on a rel-
atively small number of input/output pairs from the target
network. It may be the case that we can develop proxies for
target generators in order to support our white-box attribu-
tion method.
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